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PUBLIC REASON AND PRECLUDED REASONS
Dennis F. Thompson*
Public reason seems an odd idea. Refraining from telling the whole
truth-deliberately ignoring reasons that are relevant to reaching a
well-grounded decision-seems more like a vice than a virtue. It is
like swearing to tell the partial truth, and nothing but the partial truth.
Yet for Rawls, something like this oath is a duty of all citizens-a
"moral... duty of civility."' In justifying the policies they advocate
and deciding how they should vote, all citizens are supposed to rely on
values that can be supported by public reason. They are supposed to
appeal "only to a public conception of justice, and not the whole truth
as they see it."2
Gradually, Rawls loosened this requirement. He no longer insisted
that citizens appeal "only" to a public conception. They should not be
limited to "nothing but the whole truth." In the first modification, he
added a proviso that allowed reasonable comprehensive conceptions
to be introduced in non-ideal circumstances if they are supplemented
by the appropriate political reasons "in due course."3 Later he lifted
part of that constraint and affirmed the value of presenting
comprehensive conceptions even in ideal circumstances.4
Nevertheless, citizens must still justify their views and votes by
appeals within the limits of public reason, whatever other appeals they
may make. The partial truth is still both necessary and sufficient.
Rawls himself recognized that the idea of public reason seems odd.
The "basic difficulty" with the idea is that the duty to refrain from
* Alfred North Whitehead Professor of Political Philosophy, Department of
Government, Harvard University. This paper was originally prepared for the
Conference on Rawls and the Law at Fordham University School of Law, November
7-8, 2003. It began as a comment on Samuel Freeman's Public Reason and Political
Conceptions, and benefited from his fine commentary on Rawls. But because the
paper grew beyond its original purpose, it raises issues and makes arguments that
stand independently of his commentary. I am also grateful to the helpful comments
from Amy Gutmann, T.M. Scanlon, James Fleming, and several of the participants at
the Conference.
1. John Rawls, Political Liberalism 217 (1996).
2. Id. at 216.
3. This is the "proviso" stipulated in John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason
Revisited (1997), reprinted in Collected Papers 573, 591-92 (Samuel Freeman ed.,
1999).
4. This is the "wide view" of public reason as distinct from his previous view,
which is merely "inclusive." John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 90 &
n.12 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001).
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telling the whole truth seems "paradoxical." 5 But it is a difficulty that
must be resolved because Rawls came to see his own theory of justice
(as presented in A Theory of Justice6) as resting on values such as
autonomy and self-realization that could be subjects of reasonable
disagreement. To impose such values on citizens would be itself
unreasonable, and perhaps (as Samuel Freeman suggests7) is even
"border[ing] on a violation of liberty of conscience."' At the same
time, Rawls recognized that his own theory of justice was not the only
mutually acceptable political conception.9 Therefore, he needed a
theory of legitimacy-criteria for identifying reasons that could justify
political authority-that does not rely on comprehensive conceptions
of justice such as his original theory, or even on any single political
conception of justice.
The idea of public reason is a key component of this theory of
legitimacy. It requires that justifications for political authority satisfy
a principle of reciprocity in two ways: the justifications should contain
only reasons that could be accepted by persons motivated to find fair
terms of cooperation, and should rely only on methods and knowledge
"accessible to citizens' common reason."1 Rawls hoped that these
requirements would provide enough latitude to allow for the
reasonable pluralism that is inevitable (and desirable) in modern
democracies, but enough constraint to keep the justifications and,
therefore, the political outcomes within the bounds of political
liberalism.
The requirements of public reason are themselves justified in large
measure by an appeal to the values of a stable democracy. In a
democracy, the coercive power of the state should be under the
ultimate control of "free and equal citizens [acting] as a corporate
body."" Each citizen therefore has a right to expect that this power
will be exercised "in ways that all citizens can publicly endorse in the
light of their own reason."12 The requirements of public reason define
these "ways." In effect, the requirements represent the minimal terms
of cooperation that no citizen could reasonably reject. 3 Citizens
refrain from demanding more-from insisting on the whole truth as
they see it-because they expect that others, who have a different
view of what the whole truth is, will exercise similar restraint.
5. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 216.
6. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (rev. ed. 1999).
7. Samuel Freeman, Public Reason and Political Conceptions, 72 Fordham L.
Rev. 2021, 2025 (2004).
8. Id.
9. Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 3, at 581.
10. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 4, at 90.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 91; see also Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 216-17.
13. Rawls's formulation is "closely connected with T.M. Scanlon's principle of
moral motivation." Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 49 n.2.
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To make the idea of public reason seem less paradoxical and more
acceptable, Rawls draws several analogies, all from the law. He wants
to remind us that there are familiar cases where we accept the idea of
not appealing to the whole truth even when it is readily available. He
cites the exclusionary rules of evidence in criminal trials, testimonial
privileges, and protections against self-incrimination.1 4  I want to
suggest that we should take the analogy with legal practices seriously,
not simpiy to make the idea of public reason seem more familiar, but
to reveal some important structural properties it shares with these
other practices. Taking the analogy with the law seriously-
emphasizing the similarities between the logic of some legal practices
and public reason-can bring out some features of public reason that
have been neglected, explain some otherwise puzzling features of
public reason, and suggest the need to broaden the concept beyond
the version that Rawls presents.
Public reason is one of a family of practices which I call
"preclusionary justification." The defining characteristic of the
practices is that they require us to prescind from (set aside, bracket, or
ignore) reasons that would otherwise be relevant to justifying a
decision. The practice in effect imposes a filter on our reasoning, and
forces us to adopt an incomplete perspective. It precludes certain
kinds of reasons from being considered at all, or from being given the
weight they would otherwise have.15 There are many such practices in
public life, more than are commonly recognized. 6 But to keep the
discussion manageable, I concentrate on only one-the role
obligations of lawyers in an adversarial system.
The role of the lawyer in an adversarial system imposes
requirements of zealous advocacy that obligate individual lawyers to
present the best possible case for their client without regard to guilt or
innocence or the merits of the case, and to withhold from the court
certain kinds of information that may be relevant to establishing the
14. Id. at 218.
15. Joseph Raz's "exclusionary reasons" are comparable to "preclusionary
justifications." See Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms 36-48, 182-86 (1990).
16. Two other examples from the law may be mentioned. Indiscriminate
generality includes overbroad regulations, such as the Federal Aviation
Administration's rule that forces pilots to retire at 60, the age requirement for voting
in elections, and the federal sentencing guidelines. It also includes profiling in law
enforcement, presumed offenses (possession of certain quantities of drugs) and
irrebuttable presumptions (residence requirements for state benefits). For a defense
of these and other practices, see Frederick Schauer, Profiles, Probabilities and
Stereotypes (2003). Another practice creates what has been called an acoustic
separation between conduct rules (which tell citizens that if they engage in certain
conduct, they will be punished in certain ways) and decision rules (which tell officials
how to apply the conduct rules). The legal system itself thus fails to tell citizens the
whole truth (for example, contrary to what the conduct rules say and what citizens
generally believe, officials will accept certain excuses and will fail to enforce certain
rules or laws). See generally Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On
Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625 (1984).
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truth.17 Some critics of the system object to these requirements (just
as some critics of public reason object to its limitations). In response,
some of the rules such as client confidentiality have been modified in
recent years. But in general the rules of the system still obligate
attorneys to set aside or ignore certain reasons that would be relevant
to deciding the merits of the case. Even stronger advocacy is
permitted and required in the role of a criminal lawyer. The lawyer
may not commit perjury (or allow a client to do so), s but she is not
only permitted but obligated to refrain from disclosing incriminating
evidence that she learns from her client. 9 She is also routinely
expected to present the case in the best possible light for the client,
even if she knows that the presentation is likely to mislead the jury.
How is the zealous advocacy of the lawyer's role similar to the
requirements of public reason? Although Rawls does not consider
this analogy, he does address this question with regard to his own
analogies. He believes that what his analogies have in common is that
they are "[a]ll... cases where we recognize a duty not to decide in
view of the whole truth so as to honor a right or duty, or to advance an
ideal good."2
This answer to the question is not quite right. It misses the
distinctive character of these practices. It suggests that the
requirements of public reason represent simply another instance of
balancing or trading-off some values in order to promote others. If
precluding appeals to certain reasons is seen as a choice to promote
some values over others, then this (mistaken) objection naturally
arises: We have no reason to assume that the values supported by
preclusion should always take priority over other kinds of values.
"We arrive at rules of evidence by weighing the importance of
deciding in the light of the whole truth against the importance of the
ideals that would be sacrificed if all evidence were admissible."'" By
the same token, some citizens may place a higher value on
promulgating their comprehensive religious views than on promoting
the civility or stability that public reason promotes.
We can see more clearly what is wrong with this objection if we
notice what public reason has in common with other forms of
preclusionary justification. Balancing or trading-off values has to be
decided collectively, and in a process that already presupposes the
conditions that are supposed to be included in the balancing. The
preclusion is required to get the process of balancing going in the first
place. In the case of all the examples, it is a presupposition of the
17. See, e.g., David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study (1988).
18. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.2 (d) (2002).
19. Id. R. 1.6.
20. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 219.
21. Michael J. Sandel, Political Liberalism, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1765, 1792 (1994)
(book review).
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practice's taking place at all. In the case of public reason, it is a
presupposition of making any collective decision legitimately,
including a decision about what "we" would balance or trade-off. In a
conception of legitimacy, "we" has no meaning in the absence of a
mutually justifiable procedure for making collective decisions.
What all the cases of preclusion have in common-and what
justifies the preclusion-are three conditions: (1) a binding collective
decision must be made; (2) the decision must be made in an institution
that can be reasonably accepted by those who are bound by its
decisions; and (3) the practice of precluding certain reasons is
necessary to sustaining the institution. It is not simply that some set of
values outweighs another set, but rather that the institution in which
the weighing of values takes place itself is constituted by the
preclusion.
Consider now the similarities and differences between public reason
and zealous advocacy with respect to each of these three conditions.
I. BINDING DECISIONS: THE DEGREES OF PUBLIC REASON
As courtroom proceedings result in final verdicts, so the forum of
public reason produces laws that bind. Lawyers have more
demanding obligations and more discretion because they are agents of
parties whose future will be decisively determined by what happens in
the courtroom. The proceedings are not merely a debate; the verdicts
bind all who take part. Similarly, in the forum where citizens and
their representatives are presenting their reasons for legislation, they
are not merely debating. They are proposing to coerce their fellow
citizens. The decisions are binding. As Rawls says in his most
explicitly Weberian moment: "[P]olitical power is always coercive-
backed by the government's monopoly of legal force."22
The fact that the decisions are binding has a significant implication,
which both Rawls and Freeman seem to neglect (if not reject). The
requirements of public reason, like those of zealous advocacy, apply
more rigorously to individuals and institutions who have power over
other people and responsibilities to others on whose behalf they act.
Those who have the power to make the decisions binding have a
greater obligation to observe the requirements of public reason. Just
as the role requirements are more stringent in the courtroom than
outside, and permit more zeal on the part of defense attorneys (whose
clients face the formidable powers of the state) than on the part of
civil litigators, so the requirements of public reason should constrain
governmental proceedings more than other parts of political life, and
public officials more than ordinary citizens. Rawls seems to recognize
that the requirements can be more or less strict; he expects the
Supreme Court to follow them more rigorously than other
22. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 4, at 90.
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institutions. But his rationale for holding the Court to more stringent
standards turns less on its political power than on its institutional
competence and constitutional role (which requires explicit
justifications).23
If the stringency of the requirements vary with degrees of political
power, we should also place greater demands on majorities than on
minorities in the political forum, at least if the majorities are relatively
permanent, and the minorities relatively discrete. This is not to say
that minorities do not have any duty of civility. They should try to
understand that when their claims are rejected because they fall
outside the limits of public reason, they are not being treated unfairly.
They should accept the legitimacy of the decision, or at least the
legitimacy of the regime and its constitution. But the implications for
those who exercise power are even more important. When those in
power reject such claims, they must do so on public reason grounds,
not on the ground that they believe that the claims are wrong on the
merits. Furthermore, those in power should have stronger obligations
to seek accommodations with minorities on other matters, and even to
support a minority's cause to which they might not otherwise assign a
high priority.
In a case much discussed in the public reason literature, the local
school board and ultimately the courts denied the claim of
fundamentalist Christian parents who sought exemptions for their
children from the standard reading curriculum in a public school in
Tennessee.24 The parents claimed that the content of the required
textbooks conflicted with their religious convictions because the
textbooks encouraged their children to make their own critical
judgments in areas where the Bible provides the answer. The claim
of the fundamentalists could be rejected on public reason grounds:
No parent in a democratic society should be granted, on the basis of
an esoteric Biblical interpretation, the power to deny their children
the opportunities for future democratic citizenship that other children
enjoy. But the claim should not be-and was not-rejected on the
grounds that the parents' interpretation of the Bible was wrong, or
-even that their views about the role of women in society or their
criticisms of other religions were mistaken. This may not seem much
of a concession to the parents, but it is a significant affirmation of the
kind civility that a deliberative democracy should try to sustain.
Consider the very different message that would be sent if authorities
denied the claims of believers on the ground that their beliefs are
wrong.
If public reason is a matter of degree within the political realm, why
23. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 231-40.
24. Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).
25. Id. at 1060-61.
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should the difference between the political and nonpolitical realms
not also be a matter of degree? Some of the decisions made in civil
society-Rawls's "background culture" where nonpublic reason is
permitted to prevail26-have to some degree the same binding
character that decisions in the political realm have. The main
difference Rawls cites-that we can evade the authority of
government only by leaving the country, whereas we can always resign
from associations within civil society-marks only a difference of
degree. Even with a right of emigration, he acknowledges, we still
cannot completely escape the effects of governmental authority
because the "bonds of society and culture, of history and social place
of origin[] begin so early to shape our life."27 Similar bonds also make
it difficult to leave some of the associations to which we belong-most
obviously religious groups, but also professional organizations, trade
unions, and even corporations if we have few other options to pursue
our careers or to earn our living. We may also feel committed to an
association more or less permanently because we have developed
attachments and loyalties that we do not wish to abandon. In such
circumstances, we may experience the collective decisions as no less
binding than those of the government. They may actually limit our
choices more than do many of those the government makes.
Because the scope of the authority of these associations is less than
that of government, and because their very purpose is often to put
into practice comprehensive views that may not be accepted by or
accessible to nonmembers, public reason demands less of associational
life. It precludes fewer reasons, and permits substantive justifications
that would not be appropriate in the political arena. Nevertheless, the
reasons that members give to justify the collective decisions of an
association must still be acceptable to one another, as reciprocity
requires, and therefore may still exclude the whole truth as some
members see it.
II. INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT: THE PREREQUISITES OF PUBLIC
REASON
The role of a lawyer makes sense only in an adversarial system,
which presumes that each side has access to counsel, ideally (though
of course not actually) of equal competence and with equal resources.
The role also presupposes a division of labor, in which some
participants put forward partial truths but others (the jury and judge)
consider the whole truth (within the limits of the law). The special
duties and permissions of the role are justified not as a free floating
ideal, but as part of a practice, embedded in specific institutions.
This is obvious enough in the case of the lawyer's role, but is often
26. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 14, 213, 220.
27. Id. at 222.
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not appreciated in the case of public reason. Both Rawls and
Freeman sometimes seem to treat public reason as simply an idea.
When Rawls writes that all citizens should "think of themselves
ideally as if they were legislators," he implies that public reason is a
principle that can be applied in any political context.28 Even his
discussion of the Supreme Court as the "exemplar" of public reason
ignores the wider institutional context in which the Court functions.29
He does not consider the different roles a constitutional court might
perform in a democracy. More generally, "political liberalism.., does
not assert or deny ... claims"3 about "the relative merits of... forms
of democratic institutions."'" That is perhaps why Freeman finds it
surprising that Rawls, in the second edition of Political Liberalism,
prescribes a robust set of institutions, including public financing of
campaigns, educational reform, income redistribution, welfare
support, and universal health care, and declares that they are
necessary for the form of deliberation that public reason requires to
be possible at all.32
This institutionalization of public reason is less surprising if we
appreciate that public reason should be understood as a practice, like
zealous advocacy and other practices of preclusion, that must be
situated in an institutional context not only to function well, but even
to serve its stated aim at all. Political liberalism may not have to
decide between parliamentary and presidential forms of democracy,
but it does have to adopt the institutions of a certain kind of
deliberative democracy.33 The requirements of public reason are
supposed to put citizens on an equal footing in justifying the laws to
which they are bound. No group imposes its will on other groups by
appealing to reasons which other groups could reasonably reject. This
aim would be completely undermined if the resources to which
various groups had access were radically unequal. The reciprocity in
the reason-giving would be overwhelmed by the disparity in the
bargaining power. As Freeman recognizes, Rawls's insistence on
these institutional prerequisites does not mean that public reason has
no place in politics unless deliberative democracy is fully realized.34
But it does mean that the efforts to realize the requirements of public
reason must proceed in tandem with efforts to promote the
institutional prerequisites.
The other feature of the adversarial system I mentioned-the
division of labor-also suggests an important implication for how we
28. Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 3, at 578.
29. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 231-40.
30. Id. at 235.
31. Id. at 235 n.21.
32. Freeman, supra note 7, at 2033 (citing John Rawls, Political Liberalism lvii, lix-
lx (1996)).
33. Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 3, at 579-81.
34. Freeman, supra note 7, at 2023.
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should think about public reason. We accept the norm that a lawyer
should present only a partial case, not only because another lawyer
(or prosecutor) presents a partial case on the other side, but also
because the judge and the jury are supposed to consider the whole
case on its merits. That is, other agents or other roles provide a check
on the partiality of lawyers.
But the forum of public reason does not have a division of labor of
this kind: Every citizen (and all officials) are supposed to set aside
their comprehensive views when making laws and other binding
decisions. In the public forum, there is no analogue of the judge or
jury who could correct this partial view and supply as far as possible
the whole truth as they know it. The Supreme Court does not serve
this role-not because its democratic credentials are suspect, but
because it is supposed to exemplify public reason even more than
other public institutions. Its opinions are pure partial truth.
One might think that there is no need for the functional equivalent
of a judge or jury because the partial truth that public reason
expresses is not false or misleading like the partial truth that a lawyer
or prosecutor may present. The partial truth of public reason is true
as far as it goes. It is merely incomplete. The "political conception"
that public reason expresses is supported by an overlapping
consensus, which is composed of parts of comprehensive views, each
of which represents the whole truth as some citizens see it. But to
many citizens the political conception does not look merely
incomplete. For those who hold religious views that obligate them to
proselytize, the political conception contradicts their strongest
convictions. But even if we disregard these claims, we should still
appreciate that the truth in the political conception may appear not
only thin but irrelevant to many citizens. Even if it does not
contradict their comprehensive views, it may include only incidental
parts of their views in the overlapping consensus. Typically, it
includes no core principles of any comprehensive view, but only
statements to the effect that the core principles are consistent with or
supported by values that public reason expresses. Rawls quotes with
approval ("a perfect example of overlapping consensus"35) an Islamic
reformer who writes that the "Qur'an does not mention
constitutionalism, but human rational thinking and experience have
shown that constitutionalism is necessary for realizing the just and
good society prescribed by the Qur'an."36  But to establish this
conclusion in a democratic society it would seem that some
deliberation would be required. How can anyone have good grounds
for believing that constitutionalism is necessary to fulfill the
35. Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 3, at 591 n.46.
36. Id. at 590 n.46 (quoting Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Toward an Islamic
Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and International Law 52-57 (1990)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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prescriptions of the Qur'an without deliberating about the meaning of
the comprehensive view and its relationship to constitutionalism?
Rawls recognizes the need for such deliberation, but he believes it
should take place in the "background culture. 3 7 Citizens deliberate
about such matters in their religious associations and other institutions
in civil society, where public reason does not rule. Civil society in this
way provides an institutional check on public reason (as judges and
juries provide a check in the adversarial system). The background
culture supplies the comprehensive view (or set of comprehensive
views) that can be used at least indirectly to supplement or correct the
conclusions reached in the public forum. There is no division of labor
in the public sphere, but there is a division of labor between the role
of citizen and the role of member of society.
But this division seems unduly restrictive. It is as if a judge or jury
were permitted to influence the judicial proceedings only indirectly by
preparing the lawyers in advance, or by commenting outside of the
courtroom in unofficial ways. If Muslims have good grounds for
believing that their religion supports constitutionalism, why cannot
those grounds be part of the justification they offer in the public
forum, and even part of the justification for the constitutional
provisions and other laws they support? It would not only be valuable
for other citizens to understand the connection between the religious
views and the constitutional principles (a point Rawls recognizes3"),
but it should also be acceptable for Muslims to consider these views as
the primary reasons they support some legislation, and for non-
Muslims to recognize the legitimacy of that kind of support in the
public forum as long as the legislation itself is consistent with some
conception of political liberalism.3"
In this way, there would be room for some division of labor even in
the public forum, or at least a less sharp division between public and
nonpublic reason than Rawls seems to allow. The comprehensive
views could serve more directly as a check on the anorexic tendency
of the political conception (its impulse toward lowest common
denominator deliberation and legislation). With less restrictive
requirements, citizens might find that they could-without flouting
the principle of reciprocity-welcome comprehensive views into
public deliberation and the content of the grounds for legislation.
They could engage in more free-wheeling political debate, with
greater prospects for changing their minds not only about the
legislation but also about the reasons for it. This capacity for change
37. Id. at 576.
38. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 4, at 90.
39. For a more stringent view (closer to Rawls's) that would interpret the "duty of
civility" as precluding Muslims and other citizens from appealing to such religious
claims as a basis for legislation, see Linda C. McClain & James E. Fleming, Some
Questions for Civil Society-Revivalists, 75 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 301, 343-48 (2000).
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through reasoned discussion is one of the hallmarks of deliberative
democracy, a conception that Rawls otherwise favors."
For similar reasons, we should welcome into the public forum the
Quaker pacifists and the Catholic pro-lifers whom Rawls permits to
"witness" their dissent from, respectively, a decision to go to war and
a law that permits abortion. Freeman believes that Rawls intends to
confine this kind of "dissent from public reason" to the background
culture.42 Rawls would not permit it in the political forum.43 Freeman
observes that on this point Amy Gutmann and I in Democracy and
Disagreement disagree with Rawls.' Whether we actually disagree
with Rawls depends on how one interprets the proviso and how much
weight one places on the modification Rawls makes in Justice as
Fairness.45
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that Gutmann and I allow some
appeals to moral values that Rawls regards as belonging to
comprehensive doctrines. 6 In that respect, we do regard public
reason as "incomplete" because Rawls's political values do not
provide a final resolution for some kinds of disputes, namely those
that we call "deliberative disagreements."47  These include the
question of abortion, which in our view cannot be resolved in the
political forum on terms that no one could reasonably reject. The
U.S. Constitution as presently interpreted may provide a practical
resolution, but that does not mean that the question is no longer
subject to reasonable disagreement. Contrary to Rawls and Freeman,
we believe that the public forum should make room for deliberation
about such questions (specifically, those about which there are
deliberative disagreements), even at the risk of a stand-off in which
parties on both sides of the dispute continue to appeal to their
comprehensive conceptions rather than to only free-standing political
values. The value of reciprocity itself as well as deliberative
40. Charles Larmore, however, argues that, though Rawls's public reason should
permit more free-wheeling debate that includes comprehensive conceptions, Rawls
should have maintained his earlier position that public reason should permit
comprehensive views "only when its most elementary ingredients are in wide
dispute." Charles Larmore, Public Reason, in The Cambridge Companion to Rawls
368, 387 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003).
41. Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 3, at 594-95 & n.57.
42. Freeman, supra note 7, at 2057.
43. See Freeman, supra note 7, at 2058.
44. Amy Gutmann & Dennis F. Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement 54-55,
54 n.3, 67, 73-74, 77, 93 (1996).
45. See supra note 4.
46. Freeman, supra note 7, at 2058; see also Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 44,
at 54, 63-64, 73-74, 77, 79-91. Contrary to what might seem to be the import of a
comment Rawls makes, Gutmann and I do not "work from a comprehensive
doctrine," Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 3, at 578 n.19, but
rather argue for permitting in the public forum parts of the some comprehensive
conceptions of others.
47. Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 43, at 2-3, 60, 73-79.
2083
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
democracy provide good reasons to adopt this wider view of public
reason.
In contrast, Rawls believes that, just as in cases where legal
arguments seem evenly balanced, judges should not decide on the
basis of their personal views, so in disputes in the public forum where
moral arguments seem evenly balanced, citizens should not decide on
the basis of their comprehensive views. Instead, they should "vote for
the ordering of political values they sincerely think the most
reasonable."48 Yet it is difficult to see how citizens could decide what
is the most reasonable ordering of political values without relying to
some extent on their own comprehensive conceptions. To resolve
conflicts among political values, it seems that they would need to
adopt a perspective independent of the political values. If so, they
should be able to introduce into the public forum those aspects of the
comprehensive conceptions necessary to justify the most reasonable
ordering.
Even on the wider view that I favor, public reason would still
impose some limits. But the essential constraint should be not the
lack of comprehensiveness, but accessibility (grounded in reciprocity).
The reason that the claim that God commands that we adopt a certain
law does not count as a justification for a law is not because it is part
of a comprehensive view, but because it is not accessible to citizens
who do not have a special link to this particular supreme being. Rawls
himself emphasizes a criterion similar to accessibility in his later work.
Interestingly, he interprets it so that it also rules out some secular
views, such as "elaborate economic theories of general equilibrium," if
they are in dispute. 49 But to the extent that Rawls's conception is
more restrictive with respect to comprehensive conceptions, I believe
that we should adopt a more permissive set of requirements. All
citizens should be able to appeal to the whole truth as they see it
within the public forum, as long as it is a truth that others can
appreciate (if not accept), and as long as it is a truth that can be
reasonably seen as consistent with one of the several conceptions of
justice that express political liberalism." In this way the commitment
to reciprocity would be preserved as far as necessary but not so far as
to preclude all reasons that appeal to comprehensive conceptions.
III. ESSENTIAL CONTENT: THE SUBJECTS OF PUBLIC REASON
In the adversarial system, the scope of lawyers' obligations to their
clients is not generally defined by differences in the content or
subjects of the proceedings. On subjects that directly implicate the
lawyer, such as decisions about legal strategy or disputes about fees,
48. Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 3, at 605.
49. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 4, at 90.
50. Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 3, at 581-82.
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the lawyer may be permitted to relax somewhat her deference to the
client, but otherwise she is expected to respect zealous advocacy
across the whole range of legal representation-from arraignment to
sentencing, from deposition to settlement or judgment. The role itself
defines the scope: Within the system there is almost no significant
distinction between the subjects on which lawyers must be zealous
advocates for clients and those subjects on which they have discretion.
Although some aspects of the role may be more necessary than others
to maintaining the system, the assumption is that it is not possible or
desirable to try to distinguish obligations of zeal on the basis of what is
essential to the role and what is not. Everything within the legal
process is treated as if it were essential because there is no way in
advance to tell what might be necessary to the defense of the client.
The duties to set aside or bracket some reasons in order to press a
client's case are, as a practical matter, regarded as essential in all the
aspects of the lawyer's role.
In the case of public reason, Rawls believes that we can distinguish
what is essential on the basis of the subjects or content of the
deliberation. We can identify the subjects to which public reason
applies by distinguishing both "constitutional essentials" (such as
freedom of movement and a social minimum) and "basic justice"
(such as fair equality of opportunity) from other political decisions
that involve "many economic and social issues that legislative bodies
must regularly consider" (such as tax legislation).51 The main grounds
for the distinction is that in making decisions about these other
economic and social issues it is "often more reasonable to go beyond
the political conception.., and to invoke non-political values."52
However, this distinction does not seem to be sufficiently sharp to
support the limitation Rawls wishes to impose on public reason. For
some questions of basic justice, we have to appeal to considerations
that go beyond the political conception; and for some legislation that
goes beyond the political conception, we have to invoke
considerations of basic justice. Both political and non-political
considerations, as Rawls uses the terms, are often equally relevant in
applying the difference principle to the distribution of income over
time (a matter of basic justice) and in deciding on the optimal tax
policy (a matter beyond the political conception). Furthermore, none
of the grounds for requiring public reason-the binding character of
51. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 227-30; see also Rawls, Justice as
Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 4, at 91. In some passages Rawls writes as if
public reason applies only to constitutional essentials: "[I]f a political conception of
justice covers the constitutional essentials, it is already of enormous importance even
if it has little to say about many economic and social issues that legislative bodies must
consider." Id. at 28. But his more precisely stated view is that public reason "holds
for" both "questions about the constitutional essentials and questions of basic
justice." Id. at 91.
52. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 230.
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decisions, the need for reciprocity and the impact on the basic
structure-serve to distinguish constitutional essentials and basic
justice from many other public policies about which citizens should
deliberate together.
In his restatement of the theory, Rawls suggests that public reason
might well apply beyond constitutional essentials and basic justice,
though "not in the same way or so stringently."53 Such an extension
would be facilitated if we accept (as I have suggested) the idea that
public reason is a matter of degree. Just as the requirements may vary
by degree in different spheres (in political and civil society), so they
should vary by degree on different subjects (political values and non-
political values).54 Insofar as we can identify constitutional essentials
and basic justice, we could then insist that deliberation about them
observe the requirements of public reason more strictly. But we
might also take a stronger view, and follow the analogy of the
adversarial system. We could decline to draw any sharp distinction
between legislation that "concern[s]" constitutional essentials and
basic justice on the one hand and at least some legislation that
"touches upon" them.55
It would be desirable, I believe, to broaden the scope of the subjects
to which public reason applies within the public forum. On this view,
public reason would apply (at least to some extent) to a wider range of
issues, such as tax legislation, property rights, and environmental
regulation (all of which Rawls explicitly excludes from the domain of
public reason). These and other issues often involve fundamental
moral disagreement and affect the basic structure of society no less
than those that more explicitly concern constitutional essentials and
basic justice. They all involve issues that reciprocity appropriately
governs.56
Freeman elsewhere identifies this broader conception of public
reason with the view presented in Democracy and Disagreement.57 He
resists this broader conception, and defends the narrower conception
that he believes Rawls favors. In the face of disagreement, citizens
have to appeal to some common principles to justify their collective
decisions. "What could these justifying principles.., be," Freeman
53. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 4, at 91.
54. Rawls already accepts criteria that are a matter of degree to distinguish the
two types of values within the category of political values to which public reason
applies. The differences between constitutional essentials and questions of basic
justice are chiefly that it is "more urgent" to decide, and "easier to gain agreement"
on, the former than the latter. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 230.
55. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 4, at 91.
56. See id.
57. Samuel Freeman, Deliberative Democracy: A Sympathetic Comment, 29 Phil.
& Pub. Aff. 371, 409 n.80 (2000). Freeman mistakenly considers our view all-
embracing. As I indicated earlier, our view of public reason still imposes constraints
on justifications, such as mutual accessibility.
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asks, "except substantive principles of justice and other moral
norms?"58 The idea seems to be that public reason establishes the
constitutional essentials (and basic justice), which then provide the
necessary framework for any deliberation about the nonessentials
(and refinements of justice).
But as Freeman acknowledges, citizens appeal not only to
substantive principles of justice, but also to "other moral norms." We
should further recognize that citizens cannot escape appealing to some
other moral norms-such as reciprocity-when they disagree about
the interpretation of the principles of justice, or when they disagree
about which principles of justice should take precedence. Of course,
they cannot challenge all the principles and norms at once. They have
to maintain some framework in which to make the challenge. But the
framework at any particular time does not have to include the full set
of principles of justice, or even any single principle of justice. Moral
norms may be sufficient. If so, public reason can extend beyond basic
justice. It can range beyond constitutional essentials to constitutional
concomitants-those issues that significantly "touch upon" the
essentials.
CONCLUSION
By comparing public reason with other preclusionary practices such
as the role of a lawyer in an adversarial system, we can see its
structural properties and proper scope more clearly. But in one
significant respect, public reason differs from other preclusionary
practices: It is practiced prior to the adversarial system and other
preclusionary practices in public life. It is the means by which we
collectively decide whether to establish and maintain these practices,
and what kind of preclusions they justify. Public reason is in this way
the meta-precluder.
It is therefore all the more important that we try to develop the best
possible account of public reason for contemporary democracy.
Rawls was perceptive here (as he was in so many other aspects of
political philosophy) in recognizing the need for a distinctive
concept-in this case, a concept of public reason. He characterized
the problem and developed a solution more cogently than any
previous philosopher. Using analogies to some legal practices, I have
suggested some (relatively modest) modifications to Rawls's idea of
public reason. I have argued that his aim (and that of deliberative
democracy generally) would be better served by a conception that is
both more differentiated and broader. We should adopt a conception
that applies the requirements of public reason more stringently to
those who exercise greater political power than to those who exercise
lesser power. Our conception of public reason should also apply the
58. Id. at 409.
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requirements more extensively so that they cover citizens in civil
society, more permissively so that they welcome some comprehensive
conceptions into the public forum, and more generally so that they
deal with legislation that "touches upon" constitutional essentials and
basic justice.
